VulnerabilityAnalyzed

CVE-2024-45311

However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1.

HIGH 7.5EPSS 0.57%

Does this matter?

High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.57%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.

Description

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

CVSS 3.1: 7.5 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS: 0.57% probability · 45th percentile
CISA KEV: Not listed
Weakness: CWE-670
Affected: quinn project/quinn
Source: security-advisories@github.com

References

Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.