CVE-2022-4304
To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption.
Does this matter?
EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 16.2%, higher than 97% of all known CVEs. Patch or mitigate before the next change window.
Description
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.
- CVSS 3.1
- 5.9 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 16.20% probability · 97th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-203
- Affected
- openssl/openssl · stormshield/endpoint security · stormshield/sslvpn · stormshield/stormshield network security
- Source
- openssl-security@openssl.org
References
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.