CVE-2021-44518
The code is sent unencrypted, allowing any attacker with the same app (either Android or iOS) to add the lock and take complete control.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.30%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
An issue was discovered in the eGeeTouch 3rd Generation Travel Padlock application for Android. The lock sends a pairing code before each operation (lock or unlock) activated via the companion app. The code is sent unencrypted, allowing any attacker with the same app (either Android or iOS) to add the lock and take complete control. For successful exploitation, the attacker must be able to touch the lock's power button, and must be able to capture BLE network communication.
- CVSS 3.1
- 6.8 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.30% probability · 22th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-319
- Affected
- digipas/egeetouch manager
- Source
- cve@mitre.org
References
- https://ashallen.net/the-egeetouch-tsa-smart-lock-is-anything-butExploit, Third Party Advisory
- https://ashallen.net/the-egeetouch-tsa-smart-lock-is-anything-butExploit, Third Party Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.