CVE-2021-0942
The end result is that via an ioctl an untrusted app can control the ui32PageIndex offset in the expression:sPA.uiAddr = page_to_phys(psOSPageArrayData->pagearray[ui32PageIndex]);With the current PoC this crashes as an OOB read.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.37%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
The path in this case is a little bit convoluted. The end result is that via an ioctl an untrusted app can control the ui32PageIndex offset in the expression:sPA.uiAddr = page_to_phys(psOSPageArrayData->pagearray[ui32PageIndex]);With the current PoC this crashes as an OOB read. However, given that the OOB read value is ending up as the address field of a struct I think i seems plausible that this could lead to an OOB write if the attacker is able to cause the OOB read to pull an interesting kernel address. Regardless if this is a read or write, it is a High severity issue in the kernel.Product: AndroidVersions: Android SoCAndroid ID: A-238904312
- CVSS 3.1
- 9.8 CRITICALCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.37% probability · 30th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-125
- Affected
- google/android
- Source
- security@android.com
References
- https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2022-09-01Vendor Advisory
- https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2022-09-01Vendor Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.