CVE-2020-17439
Also, arbitrary DNS replies are parsed if there was any outgoing DNS query with a transaction ID that matches the transaction ID of an incoming reply.
Does this matter?
High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (3.18%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit.
Description
An issue was discovered in uIP 1.0, as used in Contiki 3.0 and other products. The code that parses incoming DNS packets does not validate that the incoming DNS replies match outgoing DNS queries in newdata() in resolv.c. Also, arbitrary DNS replies are parsed if there was any outgoing DNS query with a transaction ID that matches the transaction ID of an incoming reply. Provided that the default DNS cache is quite small (only four records) and that the transaction ID has a very limited set of values that is quite easy to guess, this can lead to DNS cache poisoning.
- CVSS 3.1
- 8.3 HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
- EPSS
- 3.18% probability · 87th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-20
- Affected
- uip project/uip
- Source
- cve@mitre.org
References
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-343-01Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource
- https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/815128Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-343-01Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource
- https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/815128Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.