CVE-2018-19982
The prerequisite is that the attacker is on the same network as the target HUB, and can use IP Changer to change destination IP addresses (of all packets whose destination IP address is Server) to a proxy-server IP address.
Does this matter?
Lower severity and a low EPSS score (0.22%). Track it; it rarely justifies an emergency change on its own.
Description
An issue was discovered on KT MC01507L Z-Wave S0 devices. It occurs because HPKP is not implemented. The communication architecture is APP > Server > Controller (HUB) > Node (products which are controlled by HUB). The prerequisite is that the attacker is on the same network as the target HUB, and can use IP Changer to change destination IP addresses (of all packets whose destination IP address is Server) to a proxy-server IP address. This allows sniffing of cleartext between Server and Controller. The cleartext command data is transmitted to Controller using the proxy server's fake certificate, and it is able to control each Node of the HUB. Also, by operating HUB in Z-Wave Pairing Mode, it is possible to obtain the Z-Wave network key.
- CVSS 3.0
- 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.22% probability · 13th percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Weakness
- CWE-295
- Affected
- powermanager/kt mc01507l z-wave s0 firmware
- Source
- cve@mitre.org
References
- https://github.com/min1233/CVE/blob/master/1Third Party Advisory
- https://github.com/min1233/CVE/blob/master/1Third Party Advisory
Source: NVD record, EPSS from FIRST.org, KEV from CISA. Refreshed daily.