SOC status:Duty analyst on shift

UK Cyber Defence
PB

Founder and Head of Threat Disruption

Peter Bassill

Peter founded Hedgehog Security in 2009 — the penetration testing consultancy that became UK Cyber Defence — and leads the company from The Officers' Mess at Duxford.

Before that he was Global CISO for a FTSE 100 gaming company and for Microsoft Europe. He brings decades of SOC operations, incident response, penetration testing and security leadership experience to the work, and still spends time in the SOC and on engagements.

He writes here about running security operations that boards can understand, the practical side of regulation (FCA, DORA, NIS2, Cyber Essentials) and what actually happens during incidents.

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187 articles by Peter Bassill

Insights

Citrix NetScaler again: two exploited zero-days, and why patching is only half the job

Two critical flaws in Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway are being exploited in the wild, both scored 9.5, both reachable by an unauthenticated attacker on the internet-facing side of the box. CISA has given federal agencies until 30 September. Here is what the flaws are, why the honest instruction from several national authorities is to take the appliance offline, and why installing the update does not, on its own, get an intruder out.

Peter Bassill10 min read · 23 reads
Insights

500,000 faces, one false alarm: what the rail facial-recognition trial really tells us

British Transport Police scanned more than half a million faces at London stations over six months. The system raised a single alert, and it was wrong. Before this is filed under 'surveillance that failed', it is worth understanding why the numbers came out as they did, because the lesson is not the one either side is shouting, and it applies to any organisation thinking about biometrics.

Peter Bassill10 min read · 4 reads
Insights

The phishing page that let Microsoft do the reconnaissance

I spent a few minutes yesterday poking at a phishing page that behaved exactly like the real Microsoft 365 sign-in, because it was the real Microsoft 365 sign-in, relayed through the attacker's server. What made it worth writing about was not the theft of credentials but the quiet way it used Microsoft's own sign-in endpoints to work out, before a password was ever typed, whether it had caught a real account at the right company.

Peter Bassill13 min read · 11 reads