{"id":"CVE-2026-91039","url":"https://www.cyber-defence.io/tools/cve/CVE-2026-91039","generatedAt":"2026-09-20T12:32:46.192Z","title":"Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who operates one identity-provider connection of a dynamic_oidc strategy to be signed in as a local user established through a different connection.","description":"Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who operates one identity-provider connection of a dynamic_oidc strategy to be signed in as a local user established through a different connection.\n\nThe strategy is meant to keep each connection in its own identity namespace by writing every UserIdentity row's strategy field as \"<name>/<connection_id>\", but that namespacing never takes effect. __connection_id__ is populated only on the ephemeral runtime struct built per request in dynamic_oidc/plug.ex, and DynamicOidc.IdentityChange.change/3 re-fetches the strategy from the compile-time DSL through Info.strategy_for_action, yielding the persisted struct whose __connection_id__ is its defstruct default of nil. OAuth2.identity_strategy_name/1 therefore falls back to the bare strategy name for both the identity write and the reads in oauth2/user_resolver.ex and oauth2/sign_in_preparation.ex. Since the identity resource's unique key is (uid, strategy), one row exists per sub across every connection, and the identity-match branch runs before any email check. Neither strategy handles iss, so nothing else distinguishes the issuers: OpenID Connect Core section 5.7 makes sub unique only within an issuer, so two connections numbering subjects independently share one subject space.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14.","published":"2026-09-17T16:18:29.000Z","lastModified":"2026-09-18T18:16:19.000Z","status":"Deferred","sourceIdentifier":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db","cvss":{"version":"4.0","score":9.1,"severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/M"},"cwe":["CWE-290"],"affected":[],"epss":{"score":0.00403,"percentile":0.34395,"date":"2026-09-19","history":[]},"kev":{"listed":false},"exploits":{"count":0,"verified":false,"firstPublished":null,"source":"Exploit-DB (https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb)","entries":[]},"verdict":{"level":"high","text":"High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.40%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit."},"changes":[],"references":[{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-91039.html","source":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"},{"url":"https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7","source":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"},{"url":"https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/73ad16e452670bbf843550a13361bd41e72ad964","source":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"},{"url":"https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-73j9-m294-fvv9","source":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-91039","source":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"}],"sources":{"nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91039","epss":"https://www.first.org/epss/","kev":"https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog","exploitdb":"https://www.exploit-db.com/"},"licence":"CC BY 4.0 — link back to the CVE Explorer if you publish the results; upstream data remains subject to its own terms."}