{"id":"CVE-2026-48086","url":"https://www.cyber-defence.io/tools/cve/CVE-2026-48086","generatedAt":"2026-10-28T02:13:43.694Z","title":"On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and…","description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the `GLOBAL_ADMIN` enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant's staff. No policy check enforces that \"only an existing GLOBAL_ADMIN may grant GLOBAL_ADMIN\", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.","published":"2026-08-06T22:17:12.000Z","lastModified":"2026-10-23T21:10:00.000Z","status":"Deferred","sourceIdentifier":"security-advisories@github.com","cvss":{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"},"cwe":["CWE-269"],"affected":[],"epss":{"score":0.00442,"percentile":0.38179,"date":"2026-10-26","history":[]},"kev":{"listed":false},"exploits":{"count":0,"verified":false,"firstPublished":null,"source":"Exploit-DB (https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb)","entries":[]},"verdict":{"level":"high","text":"High impact if exploited, but EPSS currently rates exploitation as unlikely (0.44%). Schedule it in the normal patch cycle and watch for a rise in EPSS or a public exploit."},"changes":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494","source":"security-advisories@github.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469","source":"security-advisories@github.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469","source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}],"sources":{"nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48086","epss":"https://www.first.org/epss/","kev":"https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog","exploitdb":"https://www.exploit-db.com/"},"licence":"CC BY 4.0 — link back to the CVE Explorer if you publish the results; upstream data remains subject to its own terms."}